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Pastoralists, Chiefs and
Bureaucrats: A Grazing Scheme
in Dryland Central Mali
HAN VAN DIJK AND MIRJAM DE BRUIJN
INTRODUCTION
A project aimed at local environtnental management may be regardée! as a
temporary organization with a spécifie aim. Over the past few decades many
such temporary organizations have been set up to promote pastoral
development and to combat désertification. The main assumption behind
many pastoral development projects has been the need to change traditional
range management practices, as the problem in the pastoral sector was
considered to be one of inappropriate land use, and the way to cope with it
was to increase control over the numbers and movement of livestock (Hogg,
1988: 183). Régulation of grazing pressure by setting aside grazing areas for
bad times and rational management of rangelands are seen as an important
means to improve the performance of the African livestock sector, while at
the same time preserving the ecological equilibrium by regulating grazing
pressure according to ecological indicators. However, this type of pastoral
development has produced an unprecedented record of failures. According to
Horowitz these failures may be attributed to the fact that 'fundamental
errors about the nature of pastoral production Systems are maintained by
planners and these errors lead inevitably to flawed projects' (Horowitz,
1986: 255).
In organizational theory it has been argued that control, régulation or
coping with uncertainty within and in the environment of an organization is
the most fundamental problem of an organization (Thompson, 1967: 159;
Mintzberg, 1979: 21). Organizations have to adapt to uncertainty, for
otherwise they will be unable to perform their tasks effectively. Decision-
making and the capacity to control uncertainty are closely related to the
structure of power within an organization and to who controls and benefits
from the organization (Pfeffer, 1978: 4). People who are able to control
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uncertainty acquire power because they help the organization survive and
help promote efficient exécution of the assigned tasks.
Surprisingly, development projects have rarely been studied from this
perspective, that is, as a normal organization, be it temporary, in which
donors, project staff, and thé local leadership and population participate.
While thé responses of pastoralists to development initiatives and thé dy-
namics of pastoral production Systems and responses to drought have been
studied extensively (see, for example, N. and R. Dyson-Hudson, 1980; Galaty
et al., 1980; Horowitz and Jowkar, 1992), surprisingly little attention has
been given to thé rôle of change agents like livestock services and pastoral
élites in pastoral development.
An important issue that should be raised in relation to thé organizational
setting of pastoral development projects is that of land tenure. Changing
traditional range management practices and thé régulation of grazing pressure
imply that control over land is taken out of the hands of the pastoralists and
transferred to the organization responsible for the new form of pasture
management. Pastoralists may be part of these organizations, as participants,
but, as will be shown in this chapter, this transfer leads to changing relations
in the power over pasture land. Of fundamental importance in this transfer of
power are the different conceptions of tenure of the interest groups involved
and the degree of power they have to ensure that their version of tenure is put
into practice.
We will try to show the relevance of these organizational issues for the
understanding of failed pastoral development projects. We will do this by
discussing a range management scheme in Central Mali, which was organized
in a dryland area in the Niger Bend by the Opération de Développement
de l'Élevage dans la région de Mopti (ODEM). This large livestock develop-
ment programme was implemented after the Sahelian drought of the 1970s1.
First we will discuss the ecological and institutional setting of the project,
then the characteristics of all the participants in the project: pastoralists, the
chief, ODEM and the foreign experts. With this information in mind we will
discuss the history of the grazing scheme and the reasons for its collapse.
In the discussion we will try to détermine what can be learnt from this
expérience with respect to the future of pastoral development.
ORGANIZATION OF THE GRAZING SCHEME
The ecological setting
The range management scheme, called Bunndu Naange (the well of the sun),
organized in a block of pastures with the code name P-17 (ODEM, 1984), is
located in the middle belt of the Seeno-Manngo. The Seeno-Manngo is a vast
area of fixed sand dunes providing good pasture in the cercles2 of Douentza
and Koro, Central Mali. North and south of the Seeno-Manngo there are a
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number of settlements of Fulbe3 pastoralists and villages of Humbebe cul-
tivators. Use of the pastures by local pastoralists has always been difficult,
because of the absence of water resources in the area in the dry season
(October-June). In the rainy season (400 mm per annum: July-September),
there are a number of small ponds, which attract pastoralists to exploit the
abundant pastures with their herds. In the past limited exploitation was
possible just after the rainy season, when herds were grazed on the fresh
regrowth of burned perennial grasses. Due to the shortage of rainfall since
1968, these grasses have disappeared: only annual grasses remain. Trees are
sparse (predominantly Combretum glutinosum and Acacia raddiana) except
in some small dépressions, where other species (Adansonia digitata,
Sderocarya birrea) are also to be found.
In the dry season only strips 8-20 kilomètres wide at the northern and
southern edges could be exploited, provided village wells were present. In
1958 a French organization drilled a number of boreholes in the area and
installed windmills to pump up deep-level groundwater. One of these
windmills (Bunndu Hindu: well of the wind) was located in the middle of the
Seeno-Manngo south of a village called Serma, at a site called Edal4. This
was the only area that was exploited regularly in the middle belt, until the
windmill broke down for lack of maintenance.
The institutional setting
In the colonial period all land that was not used for more than five years was
nationalized in the colonies of French West Africa. Used land, that is land
under some form of local or traditional tenure, enabling agricultural use,
remained under traditional régulations. This law is based on a European
concept of land use. Land is either used or not used for a spécifie purpose.
Land-use schemes such as intermittent use under a bush-fallow system,
overlapping use rights, like the right to pasture livestock on agricultural
residues in the post-harvest season, or gathering and herding activities
combined in the same area, or pastoral conceptions of territoriality or tenure
of pastures do not fit into the conceptual framework of this law. A person or
a Community either owns or does not own a spécifie tract of land, and use
entails physical disturbance of the soil. Extraction of products is not con-
sidered to entail use. For example, fodder is not even mentioned as a forest
product in the Malian forestry code.
These provisions in the colonial, and later Malian, land law have long
remained a dead letter for researchers. There was nothing to exploit for the
colonial government, so no efforts were made to appropriate the bush. Only
when conflicts arose among thé population did administrators intervene iri
land-tenure affairs, and then only hesitantly, for they preferred to leave thèse
matters with thé Fulbe chiefs, fearing riots if they made the wrong décision.
This remained so after the independence of Mali in 1960.
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The situation began to change with the drought of the 1970s. International
attention was drawn towards thé droughts in thé Sahel and massive amounts
of aid money poured into thé région, aimed to help improve thé productivity
of traditional land-use Systems and restore thé ecological balance. For
Sahelian governments it meant that funds could be obtained to develop
backward sectors of the economy, like the forestry, fisheries and livestock
sectors. This money also enabled these governments to build up an
infrastructure to control the use of natural resources. Kliest et al. (1982) give
an overview of all kinds of parastatals that were revitalized in the Mopti
région of Mali after the drought. The agricultural service (Opération Mil
Mopti), fisheries service (Opération Pêche) and rice development agency
(Opération Riz Mopti) all received crédits from the World Bank to build up a
new infrastructure and start projects to promote food production. The forest
service started a social forestry project in coopération with USAIDS (UNSO,
1983). Land boundaries resulting from a concrete appropriative move on the
part of the government, embodied by the law (cf. Ingold, 1986: 156), were
instrumental in channelling the donor funds towards government
departments and parastatals (e.g. the livestock, agricultural and forestry
services) and not to other kinds of organizations. If the state had not been the
owner of the land, it would not have been possible to obtain funds for
improving management of this land.
This appropriation of the bush was eventually in the interest of educated
urban people, who gained employment in these government departments and
parastatals. It also enabled them to appropriate the products of these lands as
they were appointed managers of these lands (Gallais, 1984). For example, it
turned out that rice lands in the neighbourhood of Mopti (Opération Riz
Mopti) are exploited by tenants and family members of ORM employees
(Gallais, 1984: 229)6.
After the drought of the 1970s it was also feit that something had to be
done in the livestock sector in Mali. Although the nomads in the Gao and
Tombouctou régions were the hardest hit, it was decided that the Mopti
région to which the Seeno-Manngo belongs would be the nucleus of pastoral
development. To this end, an ambitious programme was launched and the
livestock service of the Mopti région was transformed into the Opération de
Développement de l'Élevage dans la région de Mopti (ODEM). Of the funds,
77% were obtained from the World Bank (IDA: International Development
Assistance) as a loan, with 23% from rjational sources. In 1986 the sources
of funding changed. The World Bank (IDA) provided 43%, CCCE (Caisse
central de Coopération Economique de la République Française) 31%, and
FAD (Fonds Africain de Développement) 3%. The rest came from national
sources (22%) and revenues from thé clientèle, thé pastoralists (1%, or about
20 million Franc CFA per annum).
The aims of the programme were ambitious (Source: ODEM, 1984; 1985):
restoration and préservation of thé ecological equilibrium, promotion of the
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production and productivity of livestock, improvement of the socio-économie
conditions of thé population, and promotion of thé marketing and export of
cattle to relieve pressure on grazing land and to earn foreign exchange.
This was to be achieved by:
• a classical zootechnical component consisting of inoculation campaigns
and experiments to improve pasture management;
• organization of livestock markets and establishment of a slaughterhouse;
• adult literacy project and improvement of health care;
• improvement of water availability for livestock in marginal areas, to
relieve pressure on thé Inner Delta of the Niger by digging 70 wells and
50 water ponds;
• better control over the livestock sector by means of éducation, extension
campaigns, régulations and technical facilities, to be channeled through
pastoral associations with the aim of reducing pressure on pastures.
Although the ODEM is not an environmental project sensu stricto it is clear
that the envisaged measures and results of the programme are extremely
relevant to environmental management both in the short and the long term.
The results of the first phase of the ODEM (1975-1981) were quite dis-
appointing, however, from both a technical and a social perspective (see
Gallais, 1984). A second phase was started in 1986 after a transitional phase
from 1981 to 1986. According to Gallais (1984: 233-237) the most import-
ant problems during the first phase were: the high degree of centralization;
weak technical capacity, in both water resource development and vaccination
campaigns; corruption; and lack of trust among thé population.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PROJECT
The Seeno-Manngo was one of those marginal areas in which water
availability was to be improved. The choice of this area was not justified
from a pastoral point of view, because thé area did not play an important
rôle in thé pastoral sector of Central Mali. More important was the fact that
thé director of ODEM was a Kumbeejo, originating from thé Seeno-Manngo,
who wanted to do something for his clansmen (Gallais, pers. comm.). ODEM
started with a well-digging programme in 1975. A number of wells were dug,
with far less than the planned output, because thé hydro-geological situation
proved to be far more difficult than had been envisaged, as any herdsman
could hâve told, so that thé wells were very costly7. Luckily so, because thé
main effect of thé wells was a massive wave of immigrating cultivators and
pastoralists, because nothing had been arranged concerning the ownership
and management of the wells.
A total of 11 wells were dug. In 1984 it was estimated that at each well
between 2500 and 5000 animais were watered. They belonged to Dogon and
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Fulbe from thé area, but also to Foulankriabe, Twareg from Rharous, Gossi,
Inadiatafane, Hombori and Bambara-Maounde, Arabs and Fulbe from
Burkina Faso (ODEM, 1984:53). The report of ODEM concludes dryly: 'La
zone de Seno est devenue une véritable centre de convergence des populations
pastorales d'horizon très divers.' (ibid). Only in 1991 did ODEM launch a
campaign to install management committees at each well, when thé wells
were repaired. But then thé damage had already been done. The pastoralists,
who were initially reluctant, also joined thèse committees, because they
realized they would lose all power over the wells if the committees were
composed of agriculturalists only.
The project was part of a much more ambitions scheme to develop the
middle belt of the Seeno-Manngo, as a follow-up to the (unsuccessful) well-
digging programme. It was planned to divide the whole Seeno-Manngo into
blocks of pastures with thek own boreholes to provide water and their own
management committees, as part of a pastoral association based in the
subdistrict capital Boni. The pastoral association was headed by the Fulbe
chief of Boni, who became président. The vice-président was the next in
line to become chief. The block near Serma, a Fulbe settlement at the
northern edge of the Seeno-Manngo, with the code name P-17, an area of
12 000 ha, was to be the pilot project. The borehole was equipped with a
solar pump and therefore called Bunndu Naange (the well of the sun) by
thé local herdsmen. Grazing was regulated. Only a certain number of
animais were allowed to graze, somewhere around the equivalent of 3000
head of cattle, for part of the year. In the beginning the scheme was opened
for six months (January-June). Later on the opening period was eut back
to three months (April-June). The rest of the year the borehole was closed
and even in the rainy season no grazing was allowed, to prevent
overgrazing .
A local committee was formed in Serma consisting of Fulbe pastoralists,
headed by a local herdsman of the most prominent lineage in Serma. This
committee was responsible for the daily supervision of the project, so that no
one grazed his animais in the area outside the months specified. Another task
of the committee was the laying out of fire-breaks to prevent bush-fires from
entering the scheme in the post-harvest season. A local well-digger was
appointed guard of the equipment, after hè had received instructions from the
foreign expert. His task was to maintain the equipment and to see to its
proper use. He was provided with a modest salary, to be paid by the users of
the scheme. The users paid 25 FM per morith per head of cattle to cover this
expense. Cultivation in the area was strictly forbidden. Illegal grazing was
subject to heavy fines9. The director of the ODEM in Douentza, who
originated from Lenga, a neighbouring village of Serma, was responsible for
the sélection of the users of the scheme. Information from local informants
and the livestock service indicates that only herdsmen from surroundmg
villages were admitted.
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The only problem at the start of the project was that the solar pump did
not function according to the supplier's spécifications, so that less water was
available than needed. A conflict arose between the supplying Company and
the ODEM, because the ODEM refused to pay for the pump as long as it was
not functioning properly. The Company, on its part, refused to repair the
pump as long as payment was not forthcoming (Meyersoun, pers. comm.10).
This problem was solved by allowing fewer cattle on the scheme than was
originally envisaged, as a means of limiting water requirements.
THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROJECT
The pastoralists of the Seeno-Manngo
The Fulbe, the dominant ethnie group in the région, are an agro-pastoral
people. Their main occupation is livestock-keeping, predominantly cattle, but
every year they cultivate millet on fields at thek campsites (biile), around thé
villages of Riimaybe (their former slaves) or around wells. The fields are
manured by their livestock. Since the start of the droughts the productivity of
millet cultivation has been steadily declining, owing to thé combined impact
of less rainfall and decreasing numbers of livestock.
In Serma, where thé data for this chapter were gathered, two types of
appropriation of land may be distinguished, which we will label, following
Ingold (1986), 'territorialky! and 'tenure'. Tenure, defined as 'nature engaged
in a System of social relations' (Ingold, 1986: 136), refers to thé ownership of
fields, on which millet is cultivated, now or in the past, and dry-season water
resources. Fields are owned individually. Water resources are either collec-
tively owned, in thé case of wells, or individually owned, in thé case of
cisterns, where water is stored for thé dry season. Ownership of fields and
water resources is in général obtained by means of inheritance, though fields
and cisterns may be bought or rented. However, most transactions take place
within the confines of the village or with relatives of villagers from neigh-
bouring villages.
Pastures are not owned by the villagers, though ownership of a pièce of
land may be obtained by settlement of a rainy-season camp (wiinde: pi. blile),
which is subsequently cultivated. Access to pastures is restricted by control
over dry-season water resources. If an outside herdsman wants to water his
livestock, he has to ask permission to use the wells and in the case of cisterns
water even has to be bought. When a herdsman is allowed to stay, services
have to be rendered, for example in the form of manuring the fields of the
owner of the cistern hè uses or a field near the well. In the rainy season,
access to pastures cannot be controlled, as there are plenty of ponds which do
not fall under any tenure regime. Unless the livestock involved suffers from
diseases, no herdsman can be denied access to the pastures around the village
in that period of the year.
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This type of appropriation of pasture we label 'territoriality'. 'Territoriality
engages society in a System of natural relations' (Ingold, 1986: 136). It is
qualitatively différent from tenure, and it dénotes 'a process that continually
goes on', social relations having a permanent character, while territoriality
refers to a 'succession of synchronie states' (ibid.). Nature, that is, the
environmental conditions, détermines the scope for resource use, rather than
society determining thé use of pastures. In the case of fields, which are held in
tenure, it is thé reverse, because people invest labour or manure in thèse and
try to control natural processes by consciously .changing the vegetational
cover. This conception of rights of access to rangeland allows for thé flexible
use of pastures. Given the uneven distribution of rainfall over the years and
within the région, a shortage of pasture in one région can be alleviated by
driving the animais into another village's territory if sufficient pasture can be
found there. When it is more convenient, access to the wells or the cisterns of
the other village may even be requested.
With this in mind, it is understandable that the inhabitants of Serma have
always resisted the digging of a well near the village, as was planned in the
initial well-digging programme. As we have seen above, the tenure situation
around these government-dug wells and boreholes on the northern and
southern border of the Seeno-Manngo is unclear. As anyone may use these
water sources, herdsmen with livestock and cultivators in search of well-
manured land from all over the région settle near these wells within a village's
territory. Eventually this leads to overgrazing and disownment of the original
users of the area. Besides, Serma does nut need a 'modern well', because the
inhabitants of Serma dug their own well in the 1950s, 4 kilomètres from the
village, and this well has sufficient capacity for the whole dry season.
In the end, two attempts by an ODEM team to drill a borehole in Serma
itself failed, because the chuck melted in an impénétrable layer. The villagers
were unable to prevent the deepening of a pond near the village in 1987,
designed to allow surface water to last two more months. This enables
outside herdsmen from the Inner Delta of the Niger, in search of good rainy-
season pastures for use during the period they are not allowed to graze in the
Delta, to remain in the area until the Delta is opened again around
December. They starled to frequent the Seeno-Manngo after the drought of
1984-85 and are a nuisance, because they do not control their livestock
properly, leaving the animais to wander in the millet fields of the
autochthonous population. As this deepened pond is the only one which lasts
after the month of October, conflicts are bound to occur. In 1991, for
example, there was an outbreak of contagious peripneumonia in a foreign
herd near a neighbouring village called Petegudu. Normally the herds from
that village and the foreign herd would be denied access to the wells and
ponds, and thus to the pastures of Serma. The herdsman from the foreign
herd refused to leave the area and was beaten by the inhabitants of Serma.
The herdsmen of the neighbouring village drove their cattle, among which
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there were sick animais, into the deepened pond, demanding access to the
water on the grounds that the pond was dug by the government and was
nobody's property. Riots flared up and the hvestock service and the
gendarmerie had to intervene to settle the affair. In the end another pond 12
kilomètres from Serma was assigned to the herdsmen of Petegudu.
As these incidents make clear, the tenure of water resources is closely
related to the capacity of those involved to control access to their territory11.
Consequently the borehole of the grazing scheme Bunndu Naange met with
much less résistance, because the inhabitants of Serma had no fields there and
were only using the area in the rainy season and for a couple of months
thereafter.
The chief and political organization of the Fulbe
The Fulbe are organized in patrilineages, tracing descent from common
ancestors. Alongside this organization on the basis of kinship, they are also
organized territorially in chiefdoms headed by a member of a separate
lineage, the Weheebe, though Fulbe. These chiefdoms probably already
existed in the 17th and 18th centuries, but only in the 19th Century did they
émerge as distinct political entities with a sedentarized court, under the
influence or protection of Maasina, the Islamic state in the Inner Delta of the
Niger. Formally the chief was the owner of all the land in his realm. In
practice, however, everyday décisions concerning the distribution of land and
pasture were left largely to his dépendants, who were free to move and
cultivate within his territory. The chief depended on the pastoralists to
provide soldiers to keep away the Twareg from the north and the Mossi from
the south. The agricultural basis of Fulbe society was the labour provided
by slaves (Riimaybe), who were part of the households of Weheebe and
pastoralists or lived in sedentary villages.
The chief of the Fulbe of the Seeno-Manngo résides in Boni, where the
office of the ODEM is also located. His authority is based largely on the fact
that hè is a descendant of Maamudu Nduuldi, a famous warlord from the
19th Century, who fought numerous wars against invading Twareg (cf. Bâ
and Daget, 1984 (1962): 160, 260). He was the founder of the chiefdom of
Boni around 1870. The Fulbe in this région regard him as the chief who
brought prosperity to the région, because hè gave the Fulbe many heads of
cattle, which hè brought home as bounty from his raids.
When the chiefdom was founded, a political hierarchy was established in
the région that was later reinforced by the French colonial government. The
chief was at the apex, the Fulbe were his vassals, and slaves were at the
bottom. Under French colonial rule these chiefs were the intermediaries
between the population and the administration, so that their power was even
mcreased (cf. Boutrais, 1990). In this way the chiefs gamed powerful
positions, as they became the sole and only brokers for the pastoralists vis-à-
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vis thé administration. Misuse of their position.was not corrected by the
colonial administration, because it did not dispose of the means and
manpower to do so, even provided they had understood anything at all about
thé situation. The population was reduced to an amorphous mass of pastor-
alists and peasants. Although slavery has been abolished and thé governance
of the chiefdom has been taken over by the Malian administration, the
influence of thé chief of Boni is still far-reaching. Not only does hè act as an
intermediary for the Fulbe in all kinds of administrative matters, but thé
Fulbe also wait for his guidance in development projects. Without his
intervention they will be reluctant to participate in development. In principle
he is also the highest authority in matters of customary tenure of land and
pastures. As we hâve seen, though, customary tenure over pasture is not
recognized by thé Malian government
ODEM staff
Daily management of the range management scheine was the responsibility of
the ODEM staff of the ODEM branch office in Boni. In practice, however,
most of the décisions were taken in Sévaré at the head office, 300 kilomètres
from the borehole. If the equipment at the borehole failed, for example, a
mechanic had to come from the head office to do the repairs. In this way
precious time was lost and the cattle could not be watered at the borehole.
The same applied to décisions concerning the number of cattle and the dates
for opening and closing the scheme. They were all taken at the head office.
The position of ODEM staff at the local level is thus difficult. On the one
hand they are supposed to implement participatory projects, while on the
other they are closely tied to the directives from above.
In principle most of the ODEM staff come from the région they are
working in. However, only a few of the staff are of truly pastoral origin. A
considérable number of staff are recruited from among ethnie groups with a
pastoral vocation. However, most of these are of urban origin, coming from
families that settled in town several générations ago. Schooling among
pastoralists is very low (well below 1% in the research area), so that they are
not represented at staff level in government services, development projects or
NGOs.
Donors/foreign experts
Because our fieldwork was done at the village level, we know very little about
the donors and foreign experts associated with the scheme. All we were
witness to was a group interview by a consultants' mission (all men) to the
scheme with the inhabitants (all men) of Serma, and from time to time a four-
wheel-drive vehicle used to pass our hut at high speed. Apart from this group
interview the herdsmen were never consulted by these experts on matters
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concerning the scheme. We do know, however, that many experts must have
visited the scheme, because it is regularly referred to in literature (Gallais,
1984; Sylla, 1989) and has been the subject of a number of seminars at the
Ministry of Livestock and Natural Resources.
BUNNDU NAANGE: THE WELL OF THE SUN
Although the solar pump did not function properly, the design of the scheme
looked good on paper. Provisions were made to prevent the uncontrolled
settlement of agriculturalists at the site12. The protection of the pastures
through the establishment of fire-breaks was assured. Rules with respect to
the number of cattle allowed on the scheme and the timing of grazing were
established. Participation of the population was well organized. The pastor-
alists were represented in the local committee and they supplied labour to the
scheme by establishing the fire-breaks. They contributed to the operating
costs through payment of entrance fees. It was hoped that they would
develop a feeling that the project was theirs, which was literally true, because
they were using the area as their pastures and by investing labour in the fire-
breaks they were obtaining rights to the pasture land according to local
custom.
Initially the project was a big success. The scheme provided good grazing
and water at a time of the year when most cattle lost weight and water was
scarce. According to someone involved in the first stages of the project, it
went like this:
I was asked to monitor the performance of the calves of two years old at the
beginning and the end of the campaign. After two years there were no animais
in the Seeno-Manngo except those of Bunndu Naange. The number of twin
calves rose considerably. The director of ODEM asked me to keep the animais
at the borehole, so that he could see with hls own eyes that one cow provided
suffictent milk for two calves.
Soon difficulties began to arise, however. A conflict emerged between the
local personnel and the president of the association, because the chief refused
to pay the guard, because, according to rumour, 'he was seducing the women
of the herders13. The conflict was decided in the guard's favour, after an
intervention of the gendarmerie, but soon after he took his leave. He was
replaced by a son of the chief of Boni, who knew nothing about the
maintenance of the solar pump, so that soon the pump was wrecked.
The next year the scheme was closed, as no water could be pumped up. In
1983 the pastoral association was provided with a generator, an electric
pump, a basin of 24 m3 and two drinking reservoirs by ODEM (ODEM,
1984: 55). The local committee was replaced by a new one, for it was feit
that some lineages were not adequately reptesented. The leadership remamed
the same, and the other members were recruited in Serma. As a result of all
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thèse changes thé operating costs rosé considerably: 'according to the ODEM
staff from 25 FM to 300 FM per head of cattle per month to pay for fuel and
fuel transport, thé maintenance of the motor pump and a contribution of
FM 500 000 by thé pastoral association to thé capital investments. The total
revenue from thé scheme was thus FM 2 700 000 at a stocking rate of 3000
head of cattle and an opening period of three months. The herdsmen insist,
however, that they pay double this amount14. At thé tune this did not
constitute a real problem for thé herdsmen, for they had suffident livestock to
cover these expenses, and they had considérable extra revenue in thé form of
milk, animal health and higher priées for animais sold at the market.
After this reorganization things did not fonction properly. A member of the
local committee, who is widely known as an honest man, told us that ail
financial management was done by the president of the pastoral association
in Boni (thé chief) and his son, who acts as borehole guard. The chief took
responsibility for thé provision of fuel, thé maintenance of the motor pump
and the contacts with the ODEM offices in Douentza and Sevaré. To perform
all these tasks he bought a car on behalf of the pastoral association, initially a
second-hand Peugeot, later on a big Landrover15. He thus firmly established
his control over everything relating to the grazing scheme.
Access to the scheme was for the happy few: those who could afford to pay
the watering fees. In the dry season of 1984, 18 herds consisting of 2550
head of cattle and 400 small ruminants were admitted to the scheme. In 1991
in Serma alone there were 60 pastoral families registered, each potentially
disposing over a herd. In 1983, before the drought, there were even more
families16. We were told several times in private that Fulbe herdsmen taking
care of cattle owned by the chief were given preferential access to the scheme.
People belonging to the entourage of the chief never paid the fées for entering
the scheme.
In 1987 and 1990 the chief organized a village woodlot in Serma and at
Bundu Naange. The trees that were planted (Prosopis juliflora and
Azadirachta indica) have no local use — no one would dare to touch them
anyway. The population of Serma was ordered to water the plantation. For
this they would be given food aid provided by the World Food Programme.
The people were only meagerly rewarded. According to an inhabitant of
Serma, only two bags of corn meal, two tins of sardines and a tin of cooking
oil arrived, while there should have been a truck load. The plantation at
Bunndu Naange failed completely, because the borehole was closed at the
time of planting and the youths who were supposed to water the trees had to
walk 13 kilomètres from the village to the borehole.
In 1983 a drought set in. In the first year pastures were not too bad
according to the local herdsmen. According to ODEM:
. . . la mauvaise repartition des pluies durant l'hivernage n'a permis une
production fourragère satisfaisante que dans le Mema et dans le Seno-Mango,
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zone de transhumance d'hivernage. Dès le mois d'Avril on a pu constater une
forte concentration de troupeaux autour des forages implantés dans ces deux
zones favorisant ainsi un surpâturage rapide et critique. (ODEM, 1984: 8)
And this was only 1983. In 1984 thé rains failed completely and pastures
were bad all over the Sahel and Sahara. Herds from the Gourma, Gao and
Tombouctou région poured into the Seeno-Manngo. They occupied the
government-dug wells in the Seeno-Manngo. Under pressure by the govern-
ment, and seduced by bribes, the chief of Boni allowed free access to the
borehole to anyone who needed water for his livestock17. The inhabitants of
Serma asked him three times not to do this, but he said that as these people
were all Malians and the land was state-owned hè could not and would not
deny them access, in which stand hè was right according to the law. The
disaster that was taking place all over the région consequently repeated itself
at Bunndu Naange. Pasture and water were in short supply and a large
majority of the animais died. People who wanted to escape the disaster lost
lots of cattle while travelling. The animais were too weak to endure the
journey, because the herdsmen had stayed too long at the borehole, thinking
it was protected pasture.
In that year the inhabitants of Serma lost about three-quarters of their
livestock. From then on outsiders were admitted to the grazing scheme.
People with some livestock left were inclined not to make use of the scheme
any longer, as it had become too costly for them. They preferred either to go
on transhumance to barter milk for cereals or to stay at home in Serma, to
manure their fields, the fertility of which was rapidly declining because of the
lack of livestock manure. Consequently, the herdsmen refused to maintain the
fire-breaks. For the chief this was not really a problem, for he could hire a
bulldozer from the public works department in Douentza and the ODEM
supplied the pastoral association with fuel.
When the motor pump at Bunndu Naange broke down in 1987, the
ODEM supplied the association with a new one, worth FCFA 4.5 million, at
a dépréciation rate of FCFA 100 000 a year, which the chief paid only once,
according to ODEM staff. Huge advances are asked from the herdsmen at
the start of the project, which are not paid back when the motor pump fails,
as happened in 1991. The herdsmen feel cheated because of all these
incidents. When, in October 1991, a huge bush-fire broke out on the Seeno-
Manngo they did not bother to extinguish the fire. The whole grazing scheme
was set alight. A week before the fire broke out, the chief, with amazing
foresight, had his sons create a fire-break to protect the equipment at the
borehole. Neither hè nor the staff of the livestock service showed up in the
village, because they were occupied with the préparations for receiving a
délégation of European amateur aviators, who came with their aircraft to
bring money for a new project to protect the éléphants in the area.
During our stay the project was still a showcase of ODEM. It has been the
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only functioning range management project ever sirice the ODEM was
established. Even in 1990, when it was clear that the whole thing was falling
to pièces, a World Bank délégation was shown the project. The experts were
introduced to the committee, which willingly answered questions about the
benefits members gain from the project. In the absence of an interpréter
ODEM staff did the translation, which resulted in ODEM staff being
interviewed rather than local people. After half an hour the team had to
leave, as their dinner was waiting at their hotel in the régional capital
300 kilomètres from Serma18. This type of évaluation has led to yet another
well-digging programme. At the end of our stay, tractors, bulldozers and
Caterpillar tractors were roaming over the Seeno-Manngo. The people did not
know what was going on, because they had not been informed. As they said:
'these cars are not used to stopping in our village, they have to keep on
running' when another cross-country vehicle raced at 80 kilomètres per hour
through the village. A young herdsman summarized the situation as follows:
'it seems they have sold our land'. Still, this kind of mission may lead to very
favourable remarks on the scheme and on ODEM:
. . . The création of new structures on the basis of grassroots solidarity can be
an interesting option if it meets a need for collective action and a genuine
common interest. In the case of ODEM, this approach was able to alleviate the
dcficiencies of thé former herder coopératives, fill an organizational vacuüm
which was preventing thé füll exploitation of existing boreholes and finally to
organize self-help by grassroots producers . . . (Sylla, 1989: 17)
DISCUSSION
Although we have a différent opinion on the merits of the pastoral associ-
ation, this last Quotation points towards an interesting direction for future
research. It says that this grazing scheme was 'able to alleviate thé deficiencies
of thé former herder coopératives' and 'fill an organizational vacuüm which
was preventing thé füll exploitation of existing boreholes'. What, then, were
thé deficiencies of former herder coopératives in Central Mali and what kind
of dynamics created the organization that filled the vacuüm?
It is very likely that thé unpredictable behaviour of pastoralists was one of
thé main deficiencies of earlier attempts at pastoral development. The herds-
men of thé Seeno-Manngo adapt to the vagaries of the ecological environ-
ment by very flexible stratégies of resource use, characterized by a high
degree of mobility and individualization, as is common throughout Africa
(see, for example, N. and R. Dyson-Hudson, 1980). Consequently, their
capacity for collective action is limited. Vague notions of tenure of pastures,
which we labelled 'territoriality', are congruent with this type of organization
of resource use, because thèse notions allow for a high degree of flexibility,
individuality and mobility.
The ODEM is well aware of this problem. As a staff member of ODEM
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complained '. . . thé Fulbe know nothing about organizing themselves. For
every small décision they run to their chief, so I had to make use of the chief
to get the project going'. He forgets that he himself did little to improve thé
organizational capacities of thé population. What do herdsmen know about
'presiden', 'sekretèr', and 'tresoré'19, when they have been closed off from the
modem world ail of their life?
Thus pastoral organization of land use is designed to cope with environ-
mental uncertainty and is standing in opposition to thé way ODEM would
like to organize thé exploitation of thé pastures of thé grazing scheme, that is,
in a rational and controlled manner based on scientific indicators. If we take
a look at thé way ODEM is organized, we see something fundamentally
opposed and even hostile to flexible pastoral organization. ODEM is
dépendent on funds from donors. These funds are thé life-blood of this
organization. The programme and performance has to hâve credibility vis-à-
vis the donors rather than vis-à-vis thé pastoralists. The donors demand a
certain performance, which is measurable and proportional to thé money
invested in thé organization. If they want grazing schemes, ODEM has to
produce grazing schemes. If they want wells and boreholes, ODEM will have
to perform. If not, the flow of money will stop and the survival of ODEM
will be at stake. ODEM has no choice but to satisfy the donors' wishes. At
the same time, donors rely on expensive experts, who produce superficial
reports based on twisted translations of socially désirable statements by
intimidated informants. As a conséquence, ODEM has no choice but to adopt
an organizational structure in which every level of the organization is
oriented towards the top rather than the bottom.
Consequently, all the programmes designed and executed by an organiz-
ation like ODEM are tailor-made to meet the criteria of measurability and
performance set by the donors. ODEM started the grazing scheme by
drawing boundaries in a space, where none were known before. Science and
law as idéologies played a very important rôle hère. Scientific indicators were
used to design the scheme. These indicators were not based on the volatile
character of the ecological environment but on scientific models developed at
ranches where conditions are controlled. The law was used to chase the
population off their pastures. So social reality is forced to adapt to scientific
requirements. If these cannot be met, the scheme is not considered to be
'managed' and according to these standards the entire venture is then a
failure.
So it was logical and practical to engage the chief and to make use of the
local political hierarchy to organize the scheme and make it work. This
hierarchy was used as an organizational device to reduce the uncertainty
involved in managing pastoralists. It was inserted into the organization of the
scheme, as is often recommended in development literature. The chief played
his rôle very well. He managed to get the scheme functioning, which was
facilitated by interna! strife among the pastoralists. Prominent individuals at
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local level were bought off with free access to thé scheme. Sortie peuple were
scared off by thé chief's powerful position in the government of the day and
his relations with thé général director of ODEM. Others were herding his
cattle and had no choice but to comply. ODEM had to 'pay' him by
supplying him with thé means to get thé scheme going again and by aban-
doning control over the financial management. All the supplies had to come
through his village Boni, thé subdistrict capital, with his car, while his sons
served as overseers at thé borehole. The priée was plenty of opportunity for
the chief to profit from the scheme. The only option left for the herdsmen
was not to extinguish the fire that threatened the scheme. At that time the
chief did not dare to show himself on the Seeno-Manngo. A new regime had
come to power in Mali in March 1991, and his power base was crumbling.
So, what is labelled scientific or 'rational' management is in fact a strategy to
reduce the uncertainty involved in the management of the grazing scheme.
Professionally educated experts fulfil an important rôle in this réduction of
uncertainty. Their advice is used to legitimatize management décisions,
through which access to the scheme is denied to the majority of the pastoral
population. These experts in turn have no interest in creating difficulties.
Often they are hired on the basis of short-term contracts. Their interest is in
the next contract and not the scheme. Their value as experts is to some extent
related to their capacity to calm the nerves of those responsible by writing
soothing reports. Of course pastoralists do not read expert reports, but the
scheme was never designed to reduce the uncertainties in their income
anyway. They are participants, but in reality they have no power at all over
management affairs.
From the perspective of pastoral tenure, the scheme is a perfect example
of 'enclosure of the commons'. Originally the pastures were open-access
resources for those who had access to the traditional wells in the neighbour-
hood of the scheme. The pastures were appropriated by the pastoral
association (the -chief), when it acquired control over the borehole and
consequently over access to the scheme. This appropriation was legally
justified on the basis that the pastures belong to the state. The state in turn
has delegated the authority to manage pasture land to the ODEM (although
according to the law this is not possible), which subsequently created the
pastoral association around the chief to implement the project. There is no
law that forbids or allows this kind of programme, nor is there a law
protecting the rights of pastoralists to their pastures20. In this case wealthy
pastoralists have access to the scheme, while the poorer majority does not.
The absence of protest has been taken as an indication of the existence of
'grassroots solidarity'. The pastoral Community in Serma has been divided by
the scheme into two groups, which is in clear contrast to normal pastoral
tenure arrangements.
It is hard to call this range management scheme a failure. Although the
majority of the local herdsmen lost because of the scheme, most of the goals




of the scheme as an organization were met. Pastures were managed, access to
the scheme was regulated, 'over'grazing stopped. This must also be the reason
why the pastoral association was provided with the necessary equipment
twice. There was considérable pressure on ODEM to make it a success,
because the programme as such was under constant criticism (see Gallais,
1984).
However, from the perspective of the pastoral population the scheme has
far-reaching negative effects. Tenure relations have been changed funda-
mentally by the scheme. The Fulbe as a group have lost power over their
pastures, to the benefit of a few. A considérable part of their rainy-season
pastures have been enclosed, most of them for the whole year. Considering
the fact that there are many more boreholes that are not fully exploited, and
the pressure exerted by the herds from the Inner Delta and at times from the
Gourma, it is urgent that action be taken to devise some sort of pastoral
tenure code that protects local herders from these types of interventions.
Furthermore, the organization responsible for grazing management should be
modified to better address the problems of pastoralists.
NOTES
1. The fieldwork for this research was carried out with a grant of the Nctherlands'
Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO, grant W 52-
494). The project entitled 'Fulani society in a changing world: Central Mali' was
undertaken by the two authors, with fieldwork being done from March 1990 to
March 1991 and May 1991 to January 1992 in two villages in the Douentza
cercle of Central Mali.
2. Mali is administratively divided into seven régions, which are subdivided into
cercles, in turn divided into arrondissements.
3. Peul or Fulani, as they are called in Frcnch and English respectively.
4. Edal is Fulfulde (Fulbe language) for the 'big edf (Sclerocarya birrea). At present
no cdi, even a small one, can be found at the spot.
5. United States Agency for International Development.
6. Reyna (1986) reports the same concentration of land in the hands of a few people
in development projects in Burkina Faso.
7. The price of a well, which was FM (Francs Maliennes)14 million on average in
1973, rose to FM 54 million in 1978 (Gallais, 1984: 235). At present (1995)
these wells are having to be deepened at a cost of FCFA 20 million per well (100
FM = 50 FCFA = l FF (Franc Français)).
8. This type of 'rational' and 'sustainable' management is not uncontested
nowadays. The case for overgrazing by irresponsible pastoralists has proven less
convincing than originally thought, as recent literature indicates (Behnke and
Scoones, 1992; Ellis et al., 1993).
9. We have no data on the fines that were paid at the start of the project. During
our stay in the région two cases of illegal grazing occurred. In one case a fine of
FCFA 80 000 was paid, and in the other FCFA 400 000. It seems that the fines
were paid directly to the chief of Boni. It is not known what happened to the
money afterwards. The vice-président of the pastoral association in Boni told us
that even he did not know where the money went.
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10. Meyersoun was one of the foreign experts who was supervising development of
thé scheme. We met him in Djibo (North Burkina Faso) in October 1991, where
he was working for thé Burkina livestock service.
11. The parallels between this type of tenure of water resources and the tenure of
religious sites by Aboriginals in Australia discussed in Ingold (1986: Ch. 6) are
striking.
12. A survey had been carried out, showing the pastoralists' dissatisfaction with these
wells: 98% of the pastoralists blamed the ODEM wells for allowing uncontrolled
occupation of land on the Seeno-Manngo by agriculturalists (ODEM, 1978). This
may explain the different organizational format of this scheme.
13. This could not be confirmed by the chief of Boni, because hè refused to grant us
* an interview during the two years of our stay.
14. This may be explained by the fact that Mali entered the CFA zone in 1985, with
l CFA worth 2 Malian Francs (FM). The contribution to the scheme was
probably not reduced by 50% at the level of the borehole when the FCFA was
introduced. If one calculâtes the real costs of the scheme, the operating costs come
very close to this figure of 50%, although somewhat lower. What happens to the
rest of the money is not known. See also note 9.
15. In 1991 he bought a second car, a Lada four-wheel-drive vehicle.
16. A lot of families left because they lost everything in the drought of 1985.
17. An important Twareg chief from the Gourma was granted permission to exploit a
borehole only a few kilomètres from Bundu Naange for his own herd of several
thousand head of cattle.
18. It was in fact even worse than described here. Some members of the team did not
even have the politeness to lift their sunglasses while interviewing, which
everybody in thé village found very impolite. We were asked if they were from
our country. Luckily there were no Dutch experts in the team, so we could
answer in all honesty that they were from a different tribe.
19. These are French loanwords to depict the functions within the herders'
committee.
20. See Lane (1992) for an even more poignant example of donor-sponsored
expropriation of pastures of Barabaig pastoralists in the name of 'development'.
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